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
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# Wealthy Countries Stonewall Future of Climate Change Financing and Kyoto Protocol



PLENARY DISCUSSIONS during the Bangkok Climate talks. Photo Credit: UN Climate Change

At the end of August, IBON International attended the Bangkok Intersessionals of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Intersessionals saw intense discussion on contentious issues centering on the “Durban Platform”, which calls for a second period of commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (starting January 1, 2013 and ending on December 31, 2017 or 2020) for developed countries to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.

IBON International Environment and Climate Justice program manager Tetet Nera-Lauron attended the meeting, hosted by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP).

## Day one: Hope for a meaningful outcome

Hopes for meaningful outcomes that would lead to collective efforts by the international community to address climate change were echoed by developing countries at the opening of the international climate negotiations at the UNESCAP in Bangkok, Thailand.

At the opening plenary Madame Rose Diouf, Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), welcomed delegates and said that as it is just a few months until COP 18 in Doha, Qatar, work needs to be done towards “exploring areas of compromise so as to reach a solution.”

Strong statements were delivered by the **G77/China group of developing countries**, among others, to highlight the urgency of finding a resolution to ongoing debates at the negotiations. Some of the key areas of contention include:

(a) low levels of ambition reflected as global goals for reduction of emissions;

(b) a disagreement over having a 5-year or 8-year second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2KP); and

(c) legal and political issues pertaining to the transition period, among others.

A series of different country grouping then put across their points of view.

The **Africa Group** raised its concerns over attempts to have low levels of ambition for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, and appealed for Parties to take a holistic approach in dealing with all related issues.

The **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** said that results of the climate negotiations must be “ambitious”, “credible”, and “inspirational” to the international community. It said the results must also address unresolved issues around ambition - which AOSIS argued is inadequate and inconsistent with the 1.5-degree temperature increase that scientists say is the limit to prevent catastrophic climate change – with a higher level of ambition still “economically feasible for all Annex 1 countries.”

The **Arab Group** stated that the Kyoto Protocol is one of the main foundations of the global effort to address climate change. At Durban an agreement was reached for a second commitment period, and therefore the Group argued it is necessary for Annex 1 countries to establish their commitments. Parties which withdrew from a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol must also be asked to provide ambitious targets for emissions reductions.

Venezuela, speaking for the **Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA)**, reminded Parties that every treaty is binding and must be carried out in good faith. It challenged developed countries to honor their historical responsibilities in solidarity with humankind and with Mother Earth, adding that now is a historic moment to show worldwide leadership in the face of adversity. The ALBA countries also addressed developed countries specifically with regard to the Durban Package: “It is not

realistic nor ethical to think to ask of others what we are not willing to do ourselves.”

The **BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China)** countries expressed concern over levels of ambition, which are far below what scientists say required from Annex 1 countries. BASIC called on developed country Parties to “enhance the environmental integrity” of the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period. Similarly, the Coalition of Rainforest Nations - developing countries with rainforests - urged Parties to secure a “solid and ambitious agreement in Doha”.

The statement delivered by the Philippines on behalf of the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), a group of 36 developing countries, drove home the message that a meaningful, substantial and effective Kyoto Protocol second commitment period should be the centerpiece and focus of work for the Bangkok Intersessionals, and that the Kyoto Protocol should be the “key deliverable” for Doha. It stressed the need for ambitious aggregate emissions for Annex 1 countries in accordance with historical responsibility and consistent with science, and warned of already low pledges from developed countries possibly being undermined by accounting loopholes that would ultimately result in no net contribution to emissions reduction.

At around midday, groups from different organizations and social movements from both Thailand and the rest of the world held a demonstration in front of the ESCAP building. The groups called on rich industrialized countries to fulfill their existing legally binding commitments and undertake drastic emissions cuts without offsets and loopholes.

## **Day two: Developing countries oppose ‘Umbrella Group’ move to kill LCA this year**

At the Contact Group meeting for finance, developed countries, particularly the Umbrella Group composed of the **US, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan**, and supported by the **European Union, Switzerland** and **Mexico**, raised a number of procedural questions for continuing to tackle climate finance at the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). Arguing that every finance issue has an appropriate forum where each of the different finance

**General acronyms/terminology:**

**ADP:** The Durban Platform

**Annex 1 countries:** the industrialized countries that were members of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition (the EIT Parties), including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European States.

**Annex 2 countries:** the OECD members of Annex I, but not the EIT Parties. They are required to provide financial resources to enable developing countries to undertake emissions reduction activities under the Convention and to help them adapt to adverse effects of climate change.

**Non-Annex 1 countries:** mostly developing countries. Certain groups of developing countries are recognized by the Convention as being especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, including countries with low-lying coastal areas and those prone to desertification and drought. Others (such as countries that rely heavily on income from fossil fuel production and commerce) feel more vulnerable to the potential economic impacts of climate change response measures.

**AWG-LCA:** Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action. A subsidiary body under the Convention (UNFCCC) established to conduct a comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012, in order to reach an agreed outcome to be presented to the Conference of the Parties (COP) for adoption.

**AWG – KP:** Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol. The aim of the AWG-KP is to discuss future commitments for industrialized countries under the Kyoto Protocol. The AWG-KP reports to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP).

**The Bali Action Plan:** part of the Bali Road Map from COP 13, which launched a “new, comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012”, with the aim of reaching an agreed outcome and adopting a decision at COP15 in Copenhagen. Governments divided the plan into five main categories: shared vision, mitigation, adaptation, technology and financing.

**COP:** Conference of Parties (to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). The “supreme body” of the Convention (UNFCCC), that is, its highest decision-making authority. It is an association of all the countries that are Parties to the Convention. The COP is responsible for keeping international efforts to address climate change on track. It reviews the implementation of the Convention and examines the commitments of Parties in light of the Convention’s objective, new scientific findings and experience gained in implementing climate change policies.

**FSF:** Fast-Start Finance. A collective commitment which refers to a pledge made by developed countries at COP 15 (Copenhagen, 2009) to provide new and additional resources, including forestry and investments, approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010 - 2012 and with balanced allocation between mitigation and adaptation.

**GCF:** Green Climate Fund. The GCF The fund is the biggest single funding route for the USD100 billion that developed countries have pledged should flow to poor nations each year by 2020 to help them cut greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the effects of global warming. The decision to establish the GCF was made at COP 16 (Cancun, 2010), where it was also decided that the Green Climate Fund would be designed by a Transitional Committee comprised of 40 members - 15 members from developed country Parties and 25 members from developing country Parties. The GCF is hosted by Korea, with the World Bank as its “interim trustee”, a position subject to review three years after the GCF’s operationalization.

**LTF:** Long-Term Finance

**QELROS:** Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Objectives. The term used to refer to developed country mitigation pledges.

**UNFCCC:** United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Convention on Climate Change entered into force on 21 March 1994. It sets an overall framework for intergovernmental efforts to tackle the challenge posed by climate change. It recognizes that the climate system is a shared resource whose stability can be affected by industrial and other emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.

The Convention enjoys near universal membership. Under the Convention, governments: gather and share information on greenhouse gas emissions, national policies and best practices; launch national strategies for addressing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to expected impacts, including the provision of financial and technological support to developing countries, and; cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change.

**2CP:** Second Commitment Period under the Kyoto Protocol

**Country groupings:****The Africa Group**

**ALBA:** Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas

**AOSIS:** The Alliance of Small Island States

**The Arab Group**

**BASIC:** Brazil, South Africa, India and China

**Environmental Integrity Group:** Switzerland, Mexico, Korea

**G77/China**

**LDCs:** The Least Developed Countries

**LMDC:** Like-Minded Developing Countries

**The Umbrella Group:** a loose coalition of industrialised countries consisting of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, Ukraine, Norway and the United States

issues can be addressed, they put forward the view that the LCA's work on finance should end this year, as mandated by the Durban outcomes. Having a number of meetings on finance at the LCA, is, to these countries, a "misallocation" of time.

Developing countries are pushing for more substantive discussions on finance at the LCA since, as Bangladesh put it, there are a lot of "creative ambiguities" in the climate negotiations and there needs to be a basic understanding at a political level of what is really meant by issues such as scaling, sources, resource mobilization and allocation of funding.

**Korea** said that efforts by developing countries to raise resources should be recognized and encouraged. Reminding everyone that the Conference of Parties (COP) has a mandate to "mobilize global efforts in the most effective way", it pushed for the effective use of financing for policy implementation so that countries can change their systems of subsidies and pay more attention to market mechanisms to reduce emissions, as well as to be used in research and development in green technologies. Aysar Tayeb, Chair of the AWG-LCA, said he did not understand exactly the point that was being made by Korea.

The Philippines, speaking for **G77/China**, said that while it recognized that the LCA laid out the necessary institutional arrangements, its work was not yet finished to enable financing to move forward in a balanced and comprehensive manner. It said there a number of gaps remain in implementation that are yet to be addressed and that similar concerns have been raised by other developing countries. Citing as an example the Green Climate Fund (GCF) that was established under the COP, the LCA would still have to provide the parameters of the relationship between the COP and the GCF.

**Colombia, also speaking on behalf of Chile, Costa, Rica and Peru**, mentioned that the issue of mid-term finance had not been addressed elsewhere and that the LCA needed to make sure that there is no gap related to the provision of resources after the end of the Fast Start Finance (FSF) period.

**Ecuador** stressed that it was very important to ensure the robustness and transparency of the financial

mechanism of the Convention, and as such called for an MRV (measurement, reporting and verification) of support for developing countries to see and agree on the amounts disbursed and areas/actions funded.

**Uganda** said that when talking about finance in relation to climate change, what is being talked about is the "purchasing power" of developing countries to mitigate and adapt to climate change. As the FSF period is ending, Uganda urged Parties to reflect on whether they have mapped out the problems that the FSF was supposed to address and whether lessons have indeed been identified before terminating the LCA. Highlighting the urgency of the situation, Uganda made an appeal and said: "We are dying in the LDCs (least developed countries), can't the issues be resolved here?"

The **Philippines** reminded Parties that the LCA mandate from the Bali Action Plan was to "continue to work for one year pursuant to an agreed outcome, at which time it will terminate its work." According to Bernarditas Muller, "climate change is important, and financing is too important, but what we've had are voluntary channels of financing, loans, investments. We have set up institutional arrangements, but do we know how to allow these mechanisms to do their mandate? I am just a housewife, and I need to finish my work and ensure that everything is clean and clear for the next one."

### **Day three: Roundtable 2 tackles twin imperatives of equity and ambition**

How to ensure both equity and ambition in cutting emissions, what measures and mechanisms are needed to enable this, and how it is possible to achieve such targets were among the issues in discussions at the Second Roundtable on Ambition of the Ad-hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform (ADP). It became clear there was a divergence of views between developed and developing countries, especially on the twin imperatives of equity and ambition.

Equity is at the core of the UN Climate Convention, and Parties have an obligation to uphold this tenet. This means acknowledging that developed countries, which have contributed the most to the climate crisis, have a historical responsibility to take the lead in cutting emissions as well as to provide finance and

technology to developing countries (and their peoples) who are suffering from the impacts of climate change. This is in keeping with the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities” (CBDR) agreed on in 1992.

However there was a major divide among Parties on defining and agreeing to the level of global ambition needed to address climate change and steer the world away from further harm. What is the level of emissions reduction that scientists say must be achieved to stave off runaway climate change? What measures and mechanisms are needed to enable this? How is it possible to achieve this?

**Korea** acknowledged that global vulnerability to climate change is growing and that a balanced allocation of resources between mitigation and adaptation is needed in order to face the “clear and present danger” of climate change. It called for a low carbon green economy to achieve the temperature objectives with climate actions legislated at the national level. It also recommended to further civil society engagement.

**Switzerland** said there cannot be movement towards an efficient post-2020 regime if ambitions are not immediately increased. It outlined what was needed was to address the two stumbling blocks, (a) technical—not fully understanding the potentials for individual and joint actions; and (b) political backing to undertake ambition. However, Switzerland maintained that the ADP was not established to do the same things that are already being tackled in other working groups.

**Norway** argued that current pledges are insufficient and acknowledged that developed countries must continue to take the lead after 2020, and appealed for an “increase in mutual trust” among Parties.

**Bolivia’s** intervention raised a number of concerns and questions about what is happening in the negotiations for a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol (2CP). Some Parties think that a 2CP won’t work and would rather pursue a “pledge and review” system, i.e., emissions reduction targets are set individually and there is no way to make countries accountable to pledges made.

**Barbados** said that ambition must be based on the scientific imperative to impose necessary reductions to achieve the long-term goal of keeping temperature rise at 1.5 degrees Celsius and lower. It also emphasized the need for context (minimizing the risks associated with the adverse impacts of climate change) to be at the forefront of the work on ambition in order to close in on the “ambition gap”.

Meanwhile, Japan said that other approaches and opportunities for mitigation using the market should be comprehensively utilized and promoted. It also called for identifying a “roadmap of technology development” and promoting international cooperation “within and outside the UNFCCC” to realize global goals.

Equity and ambition: two crises at the climate negotiations which the world cannot afford to have.

#### **Day four: Same book, different pages**

With only three days left at the Bangkok informal sessions, there were a number of outstanding issues on which developed and developing country negotiators appear to be reading from the same book, but, if so, were clearly on different pages. Take for instance the open-ended informal consultation by H.E. Abdullah Bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, the President Designate of COP 18/ CMP 8, on the expectations of Parties and observers for the Doha Climate Conference set to be held in Qatar, in November.

Mr Al-Attiyah started the consultation by saying that we are close to concluding an important milestone on the road to Doha. He said that in the Doha outcome document, we would want to see balanced progress on all tracks—referring to the Ad hoc Working Groups on Long-term Cooperative Action (LCA), the Kyoto Protocol (KP), and the Durban Platform (ADP). He recognized that this will not be easy, and that there are important political choices to be made. He said that overall, there is “optimism and an understanding for the need for compromise to preserve the multilateral system for the future generations.”

**Algeria, speaking for the G77/China**, recognized that important progress had been made in the negotiations, but that there was a need to ensure a smooth transition of work within the three ad hoc groups.

### The Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 2005, is an international agreement linked to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. It sets binding targets for 37 industrialized countries and the European community for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. These amount to an average of five per cent against 1990 levels over the five-year period 2008-2012. While the Convention encouraged industrialised countries to stabilize GHG emissions, the Protocol commits them to do so.

The Protocol places a heavier burden on developed nations under the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. It recognises that developed countries are principally responsible for the current high levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years of industrial activity.

The detailed rules for the implementation of the Protocol were adopted at COP 7 in Marrakesh in 2001, and are called the “Marrakesh Accords.”

Under the Treaty, countries must meet their targets primarily through national measures. However, the Kyoto Protocol offers them an additional means of meeting their targets by way of three market-based mechanisms.

The Kyoto mechanisms are:

- Emissions trading – known as “the carbon market”
- Clean development mechanism (CDM)
- Joint implementation (JI).

The mechanisms help stimulate green investment and help Parties meet their emission targets in a cost-effective way. Under the Protocol, countries’ actual emissions have to be monitored and precise records have to be kept of the trades carried out.

**Nauru**, on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), said that a legally binding second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol (2CP) with “environmental integrity” is key to having a successful outcome in Doha. Nauru further elaborated that the 2CP should have a period of five years, and should respond to the upcoming fifth report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) with a new set of global ambitions.

It said there must be agreements on the following areas: (a) a timeframe on global peaking; (b) a review of the 2-degree temperature increase target, and strengthening it further to a target of well below 1.5-degree rise; (c) on scope and modalities so as to ensure scientific integrity of review; (d) establishment of international

mechanisms to address loss and damage, which is an even more urgent priority in light of the current low level of ambition.

**Switzerland, speaking for the Environmental Integrity Group (a coalition also including Korea and Mexico)**, said that Doha should be an important milestone in the longer process of strengthening the international climate change regime. It has three building blocks: (a) 2CP; (b) successful conclusion of the work of AWG-LCA; and (c) Doha should reflect that we are on track with the ADP and we are committed to making it successful.

**Australia, for the Umbrella Group (a loose coalition of industrialised countries consisting of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, Ukraine, Norway and the United States)**, and supported by Kazakhstan and Ukraine, said it looked forward to a Doha outcome that would balance progress, and that the focus should be on agreements essential to launch the 2CP and “avoid discussions on areas where consensus cannot be had”.

**Swaziland, on behalf of the African Group**, defined what to it is a successful Doha outcome: the delivery of ambitious outcomes negotiated at COP 17; an ambitious 2CP under the Kyoto Protocol; an understanding that Annex 1 countries will take on legally binding commitments (without loopholes); and that 2CP will be in force by January 2013 without gaps between the first and second commitment periods, in accordance with the Bali Action Plan. Swaziland reminded everyone that the Durban outcome was a package, and Parties cannot just “pick and choose” what they want from the package.

The **European Union** stressed that all Parties have a responsibility to make Doha a success. It called for a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol with the “broadest participation possible”, and for domestic policy makers to begin preparing the policy inputs needed to see this through.

**Gambia**, on behalf of the 48-country group of **Least Developed Countries**, stressed the need to ensure AWG, KP, and LCA are successfully concluded and that there would be no gap between the first and second periods of commitment. It said that if there could not

be agreement on remaining issues around the Kyoto Protocol the balance expected to be achieved in Doha would be “very difficult”. In addition to the issues expounded on by the AOSIS grouping, Gambia also mentioned unresolved debates around Long-Term Finance (LTF), scaled-up pledges for the Green Climate Fund, and mid-term finance to complement the LTF.

**Egypt** supported the statements of the G77/China, Africa Group and the group of like-minded developing countries. It added that the outcomes must be grounded on the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). It said that it “cannot accept unambitious outcomes, but it seems some countries are unwilling to negotiate targets”, and went on to say that developed countries need to be carbon neutral or even carbon negative, but that loopholes threaten to wipe out even the low pledges on the table.

The **Philippines** (also speaking for Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Comoros, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Venezuela, and Yemen) said that COP 18 is the last possible opportunity to save the Kyoto Protocol second commitment period, but the prospects of having 2CP or a second commitment period with weak targets could endanger any progress made in other elements of the Durban Package. The “balanced package” is in jeopardy, severely hampered by the lack of progress in unresolved issues. It further stressed that any agreement cannot be binding unless it would be differentiated on the basis of equity and CBDR.

**Singapore** supported the statements made by G77/China and AOSIS and identified three main ingredients for a successful Doha outcome:

- (a) a Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol;
- (b) successful closure of the AWG-LCA and an initial consolidation of the ADP work plan; and

(c) a transparent and inclusive process at every step (to the last hour and minute) of the Doha COP.

The Chair opened the floor to other interventions from observers. A representative of business/industry said that it was important to engage business more fully in pursuit of sustainability. Business participation, i.e., enhancing business and incentivizing investments, can be considered part of the foundation for post-2020 work. Parties were enjoined to brainstorm with the business/industry sector on how international processes can take advantage of innovations and the responsible perspectives that businesses can provide.

A representative of environmental organizations said that the Arab region is not historically recognized for having a progressive approach in climate negotiations. He suggested that a direct involvement of the Qatari royal family and for Qatar to put in concrete numbers for mitigation would send positive signals to the international community.

### **Day five: Northern country stonewalling threatens the poor and marginalised**

After several sessions of the contact group on finance under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), it is becoming clearer that developed countries are exerting a tremendous effort in making sure that no substantive discussion or decisions regarding the future of climate change financing would happen in Bangkok, and perhaps not even at COP 18 in November. And this certainly does not bode well for communities in developing countries already experiencing the impacts of climate change – for people who are desperately in need of resources to enable them to survive the impacts of floods, droughts and the other effects of climate change.

At the morning discussion of the AWG-LCA contact group on finance, the Chair Aysar Tayeb tried to focus discussion on the issue of the arrangement between the Conference of Parties (COP) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF). The GCF was established at COP 16 in Cancun. It is envisioned to be the principal form of the climate finance mechanism, not just simply one among the many climate funds in operation. But it has yet to take off, having been saddled by issues around sources of funds, legal mandates, and many other issues.

The **United States** made the first intervention by stating that a large group of Parties question the procedure and mode of work proposed by the Chair. It further said that this group does not have a mandate to produce a text at this meeting. This position was supported by **Canada, Mexico and New Zealand** who said that there was “no need, and no agreement, to come to a decision on finance”.

The **Philippines, on behalf of the G77/China**, countered by stating that the AWG-LCA has a mandate to come to an agreed outcome. It stressed that financing is one of the main building blocks of the discussions, and that getting clarity on the means of implementation is a crucial issue for Parties to come to an agreement before we can move on to other processes. It thanked the Chair for taking on board the views of small countries as they too are Parties to the Convention.

**Australia** noted the consistent divergence of views in the last 4 sessions on finance, and questioned the Chair for introducing yet another major agenda regarding the relationship between COP and the GCF. It further stated that the AWG-LCA has served its purpose, and that if the Bangkok sessions have had one clear outcome it is that there is no consensus. Australia also questioned the Chair again for continuing to schedule a meeting of the contact group on finance. The Chair replied that he did not need the Parties’ agreement to call for a discussion. He added that there is no agreement on how to take these issues forward.

Other developing countries such as **Saudi Arabia, India, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Iran, Zambia, Nepal, Uganda and Pakistan**, in separate interventions, reiterated their positions affirming the mandate of the AWG-LCA to discuss matters concerning finance, as well as on the need to clearly define the arrangement between the GCF and the COP.

The **European Union** acknowledged that some of the issues mentioned in the last meetings of the contact group on finance do need to be taken up, but also noted that there are differing views on how to proceed and the venue where these issues are to be resolved.

**The Philippines**, speaking on behalf of the G77/China and the group of countries that have made a submission on a draft decision regarding the GCF/COP arrangement, clarified as to why the AWG-LCA is the venue for clarifying these issues. The GCF was established in Cancun as the operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention. It was scheduled that arrangements would be concluded in Doha with the objective of ensuring that the Green Climate Fund would be accountable to and function under the guidance of the COP. Bernarditas Muller, coordinator for G77/China, asked Parties: “Are we now saying that it is now the Board of the GCF who will determine how it will be accountable and how it will be under the guidance of the COP? How can the child decide how it is going to be accountable to its parent?”

**Saudi Arabia** said it disagreed with the idea that the GCF Board will be developing the arrangements with the COP and argued that it does not see it anywhere in the functions of the Board. It requested that the Standing Committee be fully in charge of this task.

**Switzerland** said that the Standing Committee was there to give guidance, and that Parties needed to trust the systems they have put in place. It requested Parties do not “complicate matters” by developing decisions within the LCA.

The **United States** made another intervention, stating that the Green Climate Fund will have independent juridical personality and that the Board is the executive authority of the Fund. This means that Board members are not endorsed or approved by the COP. The US repeated its position that these are not matters for the LCA to decide on.

In the midst of all this legalese, perhaps more telling was the short intervention made by Japan. It said that Parties have heard a lot from the Umbrella Group, but not much from individual European countries beyond the views already articulated by the European Union. Japan said it needed to hear from other European countries, especially since all of them are key donors. ■

# PCFS champions small-scale fisherfolk at UN FAO session



Small-scale fisherfolk must own and control resources and be protected from privatization, and civil society organizations must have greater input in developing landmark international guidelines on small-scale fisheries.

These were the messages delivered by the People's Coalition on Food Sovereignty (PCFS) at the 30th session of the Committee on Fisheries (COFI) of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

In a July 12 intervention at a plenary session held in Rome on the International Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries, PCFS also noted support received so far from governments and emphasized that the guidelines must remain non-voluntary.

COFI is the only global inter-governmental forum where major international fisheries and aquaculture problems and issues are examined and recommendations addressed to governments, regional fishery bodies, non-governmental organizations, fishworkers, the FAO and international community, periodically on a world-wide basis.

## The PCFS intervention in full:

Thank you, Mr Chair.

The People's Coalition on Food Sovereignty welcomes the ongoing process of developing landmark

International Guidelines on Small-Scale Fisheries and the FAO's work in placing greater emphasis on issues and concerns of small-scale fisherfolk. Our member fisherfolk organizations have participated in the consultations conducted so far. We positively note the broad support from governments to come up with these guidelines.

We principally stress the absence of the word 'voluntary' in the zero draft and strongly urge that this remain to be so up to its eventual final adoption in 2014 for more binding commitments, especially on the part of governments.

PCFS thus has the following recommendations:

First, discussions on governance of rights, resources management and stewardship of small-scale fisherfolk need to go beyond the issue of "access" to resources and should cover democratic ownership and control of these as well;

Second, protection of small-scale fisherfolk against commercialization and privatization of coastal inland communities that result in their displacement and loss of livelihood must be ensured. This includes working for the review or possible repeal of existing policies and laws on fisheries that have negative impacts on the rights and livelihoods of small-scale fisheries that include a great number of women;

Third, efforts for continued, greater, and meaningful participation of civil society organizations in the entire process must be ensured. At the national level, there is a need to ensure appropriate representations of small-scale fisheries in the drafting, decision-making and implementation of fisheries policies and programs from the local to the international levels.

The FAO is in a unique position to help in efforts for sustainable development in fisheries by setting up mechanisms of monitoring and implementation of all relevant fisheries policies, especially at the country level. In this regard, we echo proposals for the creation of a Sub-Committee on Small-Scale Fisheries and even for the FAO to create a specific focus area on small-scale food producers as earlier forwarded. We support this in the context of developing the sector so as not to keep them small-scale in the longer run.

Finally, under FAO's new decentralization bid towards more meaningful engagements at the county level, a right step in this bottom-up approach is to ensure that human rights is at the core of all these efforts for sustainable small-scale fisheries. ■

This article was originally posted in the **IBON International** website, 14 July, 2012 ([http://www.iboninternational.org/page/whats\\_new/161](http://www.iboninternational.org/page/whats_new/161)).

## CSOs Plan Realisation of Right to Water

Twenty seven representatives of civil society organizations (CSOs) from Bangladesh, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Manipur, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Vietnam, USA and Tajikistan, representing women, peasants, agricultural workers, fisherfolks, indigenous peoples, workers, academia, environmental and support NGOs and networks gathered at the “CSO Strategy Meeting on the Right to Water: Challenges and Imperatives for Rio+20 and Beyond” on June 10, 2012 at La Thanh Hotel, Hanoi, Vietnam. This event was organized by Water for the People Network (WPN), IBON International and Asia Pacific Research Network (APRN), in partnership with the Sustainable Rural Development and Unitarian Universalist Service Committee (UUSC).

With the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development convening in June in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil twenty years after the historic Earth Summit, CSO representatives from Asia have come together to have a critical understanding of the Green Economy agenda that is being negotiated on in Rio+20 and its impact on the people’s right to water (RTW); map and assess the current CSO advocacy strategies in pushing for the realization of the RTW at the local, national, regional and international levels; and develop an action plan and key messages in addressing urgent water issues during and after Rio+20. The strategy meeting was preceded by Asia Pacific Research Network’s Biennial Conference, “Rio for People,” from June 4-7, 2012.

Key presentations were given by Maria Theresa Nera-Lauron of IBON International, Nguyen Thi

Diu of Vietnam Rivers Network (VRN), Erdenechimeg Dashdorj of Center for Human Rights Development from Mongolia and Rachel Ordu Dan-Harry of UUSC. This was followed by a presentation and critiquing of the Right to Water Modules. Focused group discussions on the challenges of realizing the right to water in Asia and a plenary session to strategically plan for the network’s next steps in the post-Rio+20 scenario were also conducted. ■

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This article was first published in **Water for the People Network’s** website, 13 July, 2012 (<http://w4pn.org/index.php/w4pn-latest-features/4-w4pn-latest-features/54-asia-cso-strategy-meeting-on-the-right-to-water-in-hanoi-vietnam.html>). The WPN supports various water-related struggles against water privatization; serves as an information and resource center on the ill-effects of water privatization while presenting community-based strategies; and acts as a coordinating body for joint actions and campaigns across the globe.

## ADB Greenwashes Asia’s Urbanization

Asia is home to almost half of the global urban population and is urbanizing at a pace faster than any other region, resulting in an unprecedented growth in urban residents and increased number of densely populated megacities. In its *2012 Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific* released last August, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) predicted that by 2025, Asia will have 21 megacities—metropolitan areas with over 10 million inhabitants—with China, Bhutan,

Laos, Indonesia and Vietnam leading the way.

According to the ADB, such fast-paced development presents both opportunities and challenges for the region. Specifically, the special chapter on “Green Urbanization in Asia” analyzes two interrelated issues—that of environmental sustainability amidst rapid urbanization. The rise of megacities will inevitably present more environmental problems, such as

air pollution, congestion, CO2 emissions, deprivation in water and basic sanitation, and growing vulnerability to natural disasters. Yet, at the same time, urbanization also heralds significant innovations in green technology that can be used to offset the said environmental damage. In its report, the ADB also offered suggestions for government

**ADB greenwashes...  
(continued on p. 19)**

# How to measure urban poverty



THOUSANDS OF URBAN POOR dwellers in the Philippines live in makeshift homes, often in dangerous places such as creeks and waterways like these that make them vulnerable to floods and other hazards. Photo Credit: Ron Villegas

BANGKOK, 27 August 2012 (IRIN) - In a world where more than half of the population lives in cities, poverty is increasingly an urban phenomenon. As researchers and aid agencies struggle to distinguish between chronic poverty and acute vulnerability, IRIN reviewed efforts to measure city dwellers' poverty and vulnerability in life-threatening scenarios.

More than two-thirds of the world's urban population lives in low- and middle-income countries where nearly one billion are living in slums, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, according to the World Bank.

As more people pour into cities often ill-equipped to handle the influx, experts are trying to find ways of defining and measuring urban poverty. Their findings influence humanitarian policy and programmes as well as basic services, including health, water and sanitation and education.

"Conceptualization and definition could be very much context-specific," said Geetha Mayadunne, a senior researcher at the Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA) in Colombo, Sri Lanka.

The UN International Poverty Centre, based in Brazil, defines poverty as "a complex set of deprivations in many dimensions that cannot be determined on a basis of low level of income".

"What [poverty] is taken to mean depends on who asks the question, how it is understood, and who responds," said Robert Chambers, a researcher at the UK's Institute of Development Studies in Sussex.

Historically, measurements have looked at a person's income ("consumption" poverty), or what a person can get in return for their cash and assets; the fulfilment of basic needs, including food, health, water and sanitation, education and shelter; capabilities - a concept the Indian Nobel laureate and economist, Amartya Sen, developed

throughout the 1990s - which measure basic needs fulfilment as well as what individuals are able to accomplish, and a "multidimensional" index, which is a recent effort to make poverty measurement more holistic.

## Income measurements

The World Bank has fixed poverty measures, based largely on an international poverty line set at 2005 international prices, or close to US\$1.25 a day in low-income countries, and \$2 for middle-income countries.

This international poverty standard has been applied to household survey findings to determine who falls below these two levels.

At the \$1.25-a-day measure of global poverty, there were between 336 and 472 million people in chronic poverty in 2005. However, the poverty standard has not been updated since then, while the cost of living has significantly increased, and experts warn that using this index grossly underestimates the

current number of people trapped in chronic poverty.

Chronic poverty is multi-year and often inter-generational, as opposed to a shock or temporary loss, which often occurs post-disaster and may lead to “extreme” or “severe” poverty. Regardless of the type of poverty, experts say income is an incomplete measure.

“It is difficult to compare urban and rural poverty with income measures,” said Jose Manuel Roche, researcher at the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI). “With income measurements, rural poverty would appear too high compared to urban poverty... there are aspects of well-being, such as employment or violence, that are not captured and not included in the household surveys.”

Income measurements often underestimate urban poverty because they do not factor in the higher cost of food in cities, which must generally be transported farther, and housing.

### **Multidimensional measures**

The reasons people are poor are as varied as the numbers who are poor, notes the UK-based Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC). People are trapped in poverty by combinations of insecurity, poor work opportunities, location, limited citizenship rights and discrimination.

In Bangladesh the number of people living on less than \$1.25 per day in cities dropped from 20 percent in 2000 to 15 percent in 2005. However, the capital, Dhaka, was recently rated the least liveable city among 140 surveyed by the UK-based Economist Intelligence Unit, based on 30 factors that included stability, healthcare, culture, environment, education and infrastructure.

A 2011 study of the Sri Lankan national poverty line concluded the standard did not capture multidimensional poverty, where the “non-poor” in cities have unmet basic needs. Half of the population in the capital, Colombo, live in informal settlements, according to the UK-based NGO, Homeless International.

In 2010, OPHI attempted to develop a more holistic assessment of poverty with its Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) to capture simultaneous deprivations in health, education and living standards.

The MPI estimates the intensity of poverty and replaced the human poverty index (HPI), used until then in UN annual human development reports.

The MPI uses the three HPI measurements of living standards, health and education, as well as an additional 10 indicators that reflect some of the Millennium Development Goals.

Whereas the HPI used country averages to reflect overall deprivation, it did not identify vulnerable groups, communities, households or individuals, which the MPI is designed to identify.

Determining who is poor is an exercise undergoing constant analysis and refinement.

“A household, which is not in poverty in terms of food consumption, could be in poverty in some other dimension,” said Mayadunne from CEPA. “Those different estimates arising from different definitions should be explored further in the future.”

### **Urban emergencies**

Urban poor tend to face a number of common deprivations: limited access to income and employment; inadequate and insecure living conditions, and poor infrastructure. Slum-dwellers have been among the most affected in recent urban deluges, while undocumented residents - whether migrants, refugees or families fleeing violence - are cut off from state services year-round.

Counting the poor is one thing, but identifying who needs help is another, as aid agencies increasingly find in responding to man-made and natural disasters in cities.

Citing increased threats faced by cities, the UN Development

**How to measure...  
(continued on p. 31)**

# Bioethanol Plant Shut Down One Year After Fact-Finding Mission

PHILIPPINES--The controversial 54-million liter bioethanol plant in San Mariano, Isabela has been shut down last August 2, 2012 after a successful campaign by progressive peasant groups and advocates, a year after it was subject to an international fact-finding mission (IFFM).

The \$120 million biofuel project operated by Japanese-Filipino consortium Green Future Innovations Inc (GFII) has long been a contentious issue in Isabela. Since 2008, local farmers and the Agta indigenous peoples in San Mariano have been fighting to protect their land from the devastating effects of the bioethanol plant on their lives and livelihoods, saying that the project has led to environmental destruction, land-grabbing and displacement among peasants in the area.

“When the bioethanol plant started its operations in May 2012, it polluted the air and dumped toxic waste into the surrounding farmlands and the Pinacanauan River, causing sickness and successive fish kills in nearby villages,” remarked Cita Managuelod, Executive Director of local peasant NGO, SENTRA-Cagayan Valley.

“Many agrarian reform beneficiaries, including those with claims to ancestral domains and land patent holders, were also systematically



Photo Credit: Northern Dispatch

displaced by the bioethanol project,” Managuelod added.

The international fact finding mission spearheaded by the People’s Coalition on Food Sovereignty and IBON International, in collaboration with the Asian Peasant Coalition and Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, upon the request of the local organization of small-scale farmers, Danggayan Dagiti Mannalon ti Isabela, and with the support of Action Solidarité Tiers Monde, discovered that apart from operating without the necessary permits, the operation of the bioethanol plant exacerbated land grabbing conflicts and socio-economic inequities as well as undermined food self-sufficiency.

In particular, the IFFM revealed that the project’s operators engaged in non-transparent lease negotiations that resulted in massive land grabs, committed flagrant violations of the Socialized Industrial Forestry Management Agreements in growing sugar cane on arable land, and leased lands via exploitative contracts that offered compensation at a significantly lower rate. The construction and operation of the

bioethanol plant also destroyed the natural climate change mitigation capacities of local ecosystems.

“The intensified land conflicts and food insecurity caused by foreign land acquisitions as revealed in this report are indicative of the situation of rural peoples across the Philippines who are confronting land grabbing and the corresponding threats to their rights to land, livelihood and life,” the IFFM report states.

After the closure of the plant, peasant groups and their advocates are now lobbying for the withdrawal of Green Future Innovations from the land in San Mariano. ■

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This article is drawn from two articles originally published in the **People’s Coalition for Food Sovereignty** website, 13 August, 2012: “PCFS lauds Isabela people, peasant groups for successful campaign versus destructive bio-ethanol plant” (<http://www.foodsov.org/index.php/pcfs-news/6-latest-news/65-pcfs-lauds-isabela-people-peasant-groups-for-successful-campaign-versus-destructive-bio-ethanol-plant?showall=1>) and “Report of the International Fact Finding Mission May 29th-June 6th 2011 San Mariano, Isabela, Philippines” (<http://www.archive.foodsov.org/html/mediarelease000086.htm>).

## US food aid programme criticised as 'corporate welfare' for grain giants

By Claire Provost and Felicity Lawrence, with additional research by Nicola Hughes

Two-thirds of food for the billion-dollar US food aid programme last year was bought from just three US-based multinationals.

The main beneficiaries of the programme, billed as aid to the world's poorest countries, were the highly profitable and politically powerful companies that dominate the global grain trade: ADM, Cargill and Bunge.

The Guardian has analysed and collated for the first time details of hundreds of food aid contracts awarded by the US department of

agriculture (USDA) in 2010-11 to show where the money goes.

ADM, incorporated in the tax haven state of Delaware, won nearly half by volume of all the contracts to supply food for aid and was paid nearly \$300m (£190m) by the US government for it. Cargill, in most years the world's largest private company and still majority owned by the Cargill family, was paid \$96m for food aid and was the second-largest supplier, with 16% of the contracted volume. Bunge, the US-headquartered global grain trader incorporated in the tax haven of Bermuda, comes third in the list

by volume, and was paid \$75m to supply food aid.

Together, these three agribusinesses sold the US government 1.2m tonnes of food, or almost 70% of the total bought.

Critics of the US system of food aid have complained for years that the programme is as much about corporate welfare for American companies as helping the hungry overseas.

Eric Munoz, agriculture policy analyst for Oxfam America, said: "This new information makes it abundantly clear that it is massive multinational firms – not rural

**US food aid...**  
(continued on p. 23)

## BetterAid Walks Out of Working Party Meeting in Paris

As negotiations for a Post-Busan governance structure and monitoring framework were finalized last Friday in Paris, civil society expressed deep concern over the process undertaken by the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-Eff), the multi-stakeholder forum responsible for leading global processes that produced the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), Paris Declaration (PD) and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (BPd). In a statement read by BetterAid Co-Chairs, Antonio Tujan and Mayra Moro-Coco,

civil society expressed doubt over the consensus reached after Day 1 especially after suggestions raised by the various groups - such as civil society, NEPAD and CARICOM - were rejected, "it is not a Global Partnership interested in generating consensus and compromise among the range of stakeholders - whether others or us".

The 35 civil society representative who kept watch of the proceedings through the OECD Listening Room observed that there was very little opportunity to debate changes to the proposed monitoring and

governance framework drafted by the PBIG and the two-day final meeting became more of a farewell of sorts as the WP-Eff ends and the Global Partnership begins.

The statement adds that civil society will consult with their respective constituencies to determine the basis of future engagement of civil society with the Global Partnership. The statement also emphasized civil society's commitment to the spirit and principles of Busan, "For us

**BetterAid walks out...**  
(continued on p. 22)

# Train Project to Force Eviction of Thousands of Philippine Farmers and Urban Poor

By Ina Alleco R. Silverio



LIKE A TRAIN on a track, the Philippine government is pushing forward with a new railway project, oblivious to the thousands that it may affect on its path. Photo Credit: Xinhua News Agency

Last May 30, President Benigno Aquino III appointed his former running mate and defeated vice-presidential candidate in the May 2010 elections Manuel “Mar Roxas” as new secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC). Immediately after, a progressive lawmaker and an activist farmers groups decried the appointment as a “conflict of interest.”

Anakpawis Representative Rafael Mariano and the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) said that Roxas’ appointment to the DOTC was “payback” from President Aquino and that with Roxas at the helm of the DOTC, the plans for the construction of the billion-dollar Metro Rail Transit Line 7 project will inevitably benefit Roxas and his family.

Mariano said that Roxas, a scion of the Araneta clan, will make sure that the MRT-7 railways will be built on Araneta property. Mariano was referring to the DOTC’s \$1.235 billion MRT-7 that will run from Tungkong Mangga in San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan; to SM City North EDSA, linking with the Light Rail Transit (LRT) Line 1 and Metro Rail Transit (MRT) 3.

“It appears that the billion-dollar MRT-7 train project is the ultimate concession behind Roxas’ acceptance of the DOTC portfolio,” Mariano said. He said that formal investigations should be made into the feasibility of the MRT 7 project and the extent of the damage it will wreak on the communities of farmers that will be demolished during the project construction.

For his part, KMP secretary general Danilo Ramos expressed fears that with Roxas heading the DOTC and the MRT 7 project, there will be massive land-grabbing of farmers' lands in Tungkong Mangga.

According to Ramos, the MRT 7 project will displace more than 300 farmer-families in the 311 hectares of lands owned by the Aranetas in Tungkong Mangga. From Tungkong Mangga, the MRT 7 will pass through Tala and Pangarap Village in Caloocan City, where another 40,000 residents in dispute with Gregorio "Greggy" Araneta's Carmel Development are in danger of losing their homes.

Ramos said MRT 7 project construction plans bear similarities with the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway where the Cojuangcos were paid P83 million (US\$356,900) by the government for the construction of the highway inside Hacienda Luisita.

After his appointment as DOTC secretary, the president is reportedly giving Roxas a free hand in running the department and its multi-billion-peso contracts mainly involving public-private partnerships, such as the Philippine International Air Terminals Co (Piatco), the NBN broadband deal, the RoRo project (Roll on Roll off vessels or the Nautical Highway), and the Light Rail Transit (LRT) and MRT projects.

"Roxas and the pro-Araneta MRT 7 project will face stiff opposition from farmers and the urban poor. We will strongly oppose his appointment as DOTC chief at the Commission on Appointments," Ramos said. "We demand a stop to the MRT 7 project because it will open the floodgates to demolition operations, landgrabbing and eviction of farmers and urban poor."

Reports reveal that the MRT 7's depot and intermodal bus-train station coupled with a commercial-residential project will be built at the center of the 311-hectare contested agricultural land in Tungkong Mangga in Bulacan.

### **Aranetas have no legal claim to Tungkong Mangga**

According to the KMP, the Aranetas have no legal claim to the Tungkong Mangga lands. The farmers group said that during martial law in the 1970s, the Aranetas sold

the land to the Manila Banking Corporation (MBC) owned by cronies of the former dictator Ferdinand Marcos.

In the 1980s, it was revealed that the MBC was deeply in debt to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). When Corazon Aquino became president, bank owner and ex-crony Jose Fernandez sold the MBC and by 1987, the bank was under the BSP.

"It's clear then that the Aranetas' claim to the land is illegal and tainted. They've been using the land they sold to the MBC and by extension to Marcos cronies. When the MBC was taken over by the BSP, it became government-owned, and so has the Tungkong Mangga land that was equivalent to the MBC's funds. Tungkong Mangga is government land and there's no argument that it should be covered by agrarian reform and given to the farmers," said Ramos.

### **Covered in the land reform program**

Ramos went on to explain that in 1998, the Department of Agrarian Reform ordered the coverage of 311 hectares of land under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Aranetas opposed the decision, filed a petition for exemption from CARP coverage, and deployed private security guards. Since then, the Aranetas has been claiming ownership of the 311 hectares. In the meantime, the resident-farmers and their groups Sandigang Samahan ng Magsasaka (SASAMAG), TMUFAI and the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Sitio Dalandanan (SAMAGDA) have been exposed to a continuing harassment campaign from goons and other armed forces allegedly sent by the Aranetas.

"The dispute is now pending before the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC)," he said.

According to the KMP, for the last year elements of the military have been seen patrolling from one house to another, conducting a supposed "census" and taking pictures of farmers and their houses. A few leaders of the peasant groups have also been accused of protecting members of the New People's Army (NPA).

Rolando Javier, a leader of SAMAGDA and a respondent in the land dispute case the Aranetas filed, said that security guards and armed goons have occupied the

houses and lots of those evicted in Sitio Dalandanan. The soldiers reportedly carried high-powered firearms, sowing fear and spreading malicious gossip in the communities. Javier said that guards and goons continue to increase in number after the peasants staged a picket at the Aranetas' office in Makati last January 20, 2010.

In November 2009, the Gregorio Araneta Inc. (GAInc.) and Araneta Properties Inc. filed unlawful detainer cases against about 30 farming families. Some of them have been farming in the area for three to four decades.

“The Araneta land conflict and the MRT-7 project is another testament of the sham CARP's failure to

defend farmers' rights to the lands,” Ramos said. “The haciendero tandem of President Aquino as chairman of the PARC and Roxas as DOTC chief will without doubt lead to much grief for the urban poor and Tungkong Mangga famers. This is another so-called development project that's being imposed on the people at the expense of their welfare, livelihood and very survival.” ■

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This is an abridged version of an article that originally appeared in the Philippine online news site **Bulatlat**, 23 June 2011 (<http://bulatlat.com/main/2011/06/23/with-mar-roxas-at-dotc-helm-eviction-of-thousands-of-farmers-urban-poor-in-land-dispute-against-araneta-clan-feared-kilang-magbubukid-ng-pilipinas/>).

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## ADB greenwashes... (continued from p. 12)

intervention that will ensure green urbanization in the region.

Despite the ADB's celebratory tone on urban progress, many Southern CSO's remained critical of the proposed “green urbanization” project. The Water for the People Network (W4PN), a Southern CSO dedicated to strengthening peoples' campaigns on the right to water, says that the high incidence of urban poverty in the region belies the ADB's claims regarding the viability of the said project.

“The ADB's estimation of urbanization as an indicator of human development is a curious statement, considering the gross inequality and increased incident rates of theft and murder that come with urbanization, as illustrated by UN studies on the state of cities around the world and in Asia. It is also worth mentioning that 60% of the world's most polluted cities are

in Asia and 67% of all Asian cities would not even pass the European Union's air quality standard.”

“Contrary to ADB's claim that green urbanization will “help raise household incomes and firm profitability”, statistics reveal that the most unequal cities (above the Gini Coefficient International Alert Line) are also among Asia's top financial centers with high GDPs, namely Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi,” the W4PN asserted.

Citing several instances of big-ticket urban water projects won by companies of local elites in partnership with transnational corporations, the W4PN also reiterated the need to closely examine the direct correlation between urbanization, poverty and access to basic social services, such as clean water.

“With the inequality that cities breed, the disparity in income and wealth also affects access to clean water and sanitation. Consequently, rapid urbanization has an inverse effect on water coverage. Even UN-HABITAT agrees that the benefits said to be brought by urbanization will be undermined by the increase in poverty that goes with it, particularly in cities determined by pre-existing power relations that enable or reinforce social inequity,” the W4PN concluded. ■

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This article was drawn from the following articles: ADB claims Asia's 'Green Urbanization' is good, but urban poverty shows otherwise, August 15, 2012 ([http://www.iboninternational.org/page/whats\\_new/169](http://www.iboninternational.org/page/whats_new/169)), Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific, August 2012 (<http://www.adb.org/publications/key-indicators-asia-and-pacific-2012>) and Part I—Special Chapter on Green Urbanization in Asia, August 2012 (<http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2012/ki2012-special-chapter.pdf>)

# The Marikana Massacre: Workers' Grievances Must Not be Forgotten

By Emily Paulin



A MAN carries a streamer calling for justice for the victims of the Marikana Massacre. Photo Credit: LouHadouken

In the past week [August 14-21], much of the reporting concerning the massacre at the Lonmin Marikana mine in which 34 striking platinum miners were killed by police has done little to engender sympathy for the cause of South African miners. Accounts of the strikers' 'threatening nature', use of petrol bombs and the deaths of two police officers will go far towards confirming the stereotype of the underclass African as violent, wild and uncontrollable.

Two police officers were "hacked" to death by machetes and at least two, possibly six, handguns were recovered from among the dead protesters. Some miners were reported to have engaged in rituals, war chants and spear brandishing. From these reports, one might be inclined to think that the incident at Marikana stands as proof that South Africa is a dangerous place to do business – a place of instability, with political and union infighting, poorly trained police, and an unruly underclass still dealing with the legacy of apartheid 18 years after it came to an end.

Are these viewpoints helpful, or do they simply distract from the important issues of reform within the mining sector? Is this tragedy unique to post-apartheid South Africa or could it be just part of a timeless labour dispute witnessed in mining industries the world over?

## Background to the violence

The episode began when Marikana miners walked away from their posts in defiance of their employers, their unions and the law. They demanded better treatment. Fed up with poor working and living conditions, these miners were willing to risk losing their jobs in an area beset with unemployment. Low-wage workers in competitive industries

such as mining do not strike lightly, but do so as a last resort.

The demands made to Lonmin, whose headquarters are based in London, included a wage increase from R4,000 (\$480) to R12,500 (\$1,500) a month, greater safety provisions in the mines, and entitlement to overtime. Some supporters of the workers' cause, including former ANC youth leader Julius Malema, have even called for the mine to be seized from private companies and nationalised by the South African government. Previous concessions have been made by Lonmin, but many see these as having been insufficient.

Much of the recent commentary on the strikes has focused on the division between the traditional miners' union, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), and the younger Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU). In late January to February of this year, tensions arose between the two unions over strikes and calls for pay rises at the Impala platinum mine in Rustenburg. AMCU was accused of using violent tactics and of trying to impede negotiations to further its own membership drive by unions such as NUM which has been losing support. Meanwhile, NUM has been accused of having too close a relationship to both South Africa's ruling African National Congress party (ANC) and Lonmin by rival unions. It is the largest union in the COSATU trade union federation which is allied to the ANC and Cyril Ramaphosa, a former NUM Secretary General and multi-millionaire, is widely tipped as a future ANC President.

Furthermore, many of the various secondary and tertiary actors in this story (politicians, union leaders, traders in platinum) appear to be using the Marikana tragedy as an opportunity to appeal to their own interests. Malema has called for the resignation of President Jacob Zuma for doing little to benefit the nation's poor, while Zuma, in an equally calculated move, declared six days of mourning for those killed in the clashes last week.

These dealings all divert attention from the real issues of dangerous conditions in mines, miners' insufficient wages, rising inequality, and the failure of both unions and political leaders to speak up for the working

poor, not to mention the failure of the police force in responding appropriately to the protests.

### **Class battles**

The Marikana massacre has been likened to the 1960 Sharpeville massacre in which 69 anti-apartheid protesters were killed by police. The recent clashes have brought back painful memories of police-protester conflicts long thought to be a thing of the past. Although overcoming apartheid reorganised the political and social system, South Africa's economic system has continually failed to bring prosperity to all. Marikana thus represents a class struggle – the police hands holding automatic weaponry may be white and black this time, but they still shoot to kill working-class protesters.

The Marikana massacre should be placed in a long line of violent labour disputes in the mining sector across the globe. To understand Marikana, we must learn from Ludlow, Colorado, where in 1914 miners went on strike for nearly identical reasons as the Marikana miners. At least 19 women and children encamped with the striking miners were burned to death in their tents by the Colorado National Guard. In Serene, Colorado, six strikers were gunned down at the Columbine mine, by the Colorado National Guard in 1927. In Hazelton, Pennsylvania, the police killed nineteen strikers marching in support of their newly formed union, at the Lattimer mine in 1927.

These miners struck for nearly identical reasons: union recognition, a living wage and dignity. At Columbine, the course of events was eerily similar to that at Marikana; machine gun fire mowing down strikers in a matter of minutes. Living conditions were almost identical, cramped overpriced quarters, with limited facilities and frustratingly poor services.

Although these events occurred nearly a century ago and on the other side of the world, they occupy common ground. They represent the common experience of underground miners. Exploited by the powers that be, unwilling to accept their plight lying down, they are always met with resistance as they stand up and make demands for dignity and fair treatment. Unfortunately, it is often only after violence like Marikana, Columbine or Ludlow that reform makes inroads.

The episode at Marikana throws into sharp relief the many social and political problems facing South Africa. The tragedy was not an isolated or a freak occurrence. It was long-standing tensions and social unrest that contributed to the strikers' confrontational behaviour towards the authorities and to the police force's excessively forceful response.

There will be a great deal of analysis and soul searching in the aftermath of the massacre. It is crucial that the core demands of the miners are not forgotten: improved working conditions, freedom of association, and adequate wages. ■

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This article was originally published by the online news portal **Think Africa Press**, 21 August, 2012 (<http://thinkafricapress.com/south-africa/marikana-massacre-still-labour-issue-num-lonmin>). Emily Paulin is a freelance researcher and former union organiser, specializing in civil society and labour issues as well as development in post-conflict societies.

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## BetterAid walks out... (continued from p. 16)

[civil society], that means moving beyond paternalism and power imbalances to inclusive partnership and mutual respect”.

At the final meeting of the WP-Eff, Andrew Mitchell, UK International Development Secretary, was named one of the three Co-Chairs of the Global Partnership. The other two co-chairs, one from an emerging economy and the other from partner country, as well as the 18 members of the Steering Committee of the Global Partnership will be identified by end of July. Civil society is allotted one seat in the Steering Committee. In terms of monitoring the Global Partnership, a set of 10 indicators were approved with the following focus:

- Indicator 1. Development co-operation is focused on results that meet developing countries' priorities
- Indicator 2. Civil society operates within an environment that maximises its engagement in and contribution to development
- Indicator 3. Engagement and contribution of the private sector to development
- Indicator 4. Transparency: information on development co-operation is publicly available
- Indicator 5a. Development co-operation is more predictable (annual predictability)
- Indicator 5b. Development co-operation is more predictable (medium-term predictability)

- Indicator 6. Aid is on budgets which are subject to parliamentary scrutiny
- Indicator 7. Mutual accountability among co-operation actors is strengthened through inclusive reviews
- Indicator 8. Gender equality and women's empowerment
- Indicator 9a. Quality of developing country PFM systems
- Indicator 9b. Use of country PFM and procurement systems
- Indicator 10. Aid is untied

The first six months after the HLF-4 in Forum in Busan, South Korea, was devoted to developing proposals on the Post-Busan governance and monitoring framework. A group, called the Post-Busan Interim Group (PBIG), was mandated to develop the proposals for the two important components of the work Post-Busan. These proposals were presented for endorsement to the members of the WP-Eff during its final meeting in Paris last 28-29 July 2012. ■

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This article was originally published in the **Better Aid** website, 29 June, 2012 (<http://betteraid.org/en/news/286-latest-news/562-final-meeting-of-wp-eff-came-to-a-close-civil-society-question-inclusiveness-of-the-process.html>). BetterAid unites over 700 development organisations from civil society, and has been working on development cooperation and challenging the aid effectiveness agenda since January 2007.

## US food aid... (continued from p. 16)

America and not farmers – that are the direct beneficiaries of the rigged rules governing the US food aid programme.

“The more the reality of who benefits from these deals is exposed to the light of transparency and open debate, the less defensible current policy becomes,” said Munoz.

A USDA spokesman defended the aid programme, however, saying it benefited 33 million people worldwide between 2009 and 2012 while supporting jobs in the US.

“Farming operations of all sizes often sell their grain or other goods to larger entities for storage and distribution (or processing in some cases), benefiting the entire value chain and US economy,” he said.

But aid experts questioned whether the programme represented value for money and was the best way of feeding hungry people in poor countries.

Rob Bailey, fellow of the UK thinktank Chatham House, said: “When you have got a process as concentrated and as uncompetitive as what the Guardian analysis reveals, you would expect taxpayers to be overpaying for the services of agribusiness.

“We know only 40 cents of every taxpayer dollar goes on food itself, the rest goes into the pockets of agribusiness and the cost of freighting.”

Legislation passed in the 1950s dictates how US food aid to foreign countries operates, with the vast majority of it tied so that it must be purchased, processed and shipped by American companies, even if there are cheaper alternatives. It is an approach to aid most other donor countries have abandoned, saying it raises prices, delays deliveries, damages developing countries’ markets, and does little to end dependence on foreign assistance.

The European Union changed its food aid policy in 1996, shifting to cash donations, while Canada fully “untied” its food aid budget in 2010 – a move that has been commended internationally, including by the OECD.

Some experts in the US would like to see a similar refocusing of American food aid. The US government’s top development official, Raj Shah, head of the US agency for international development (USAid), warned last year that his agency was “no longer satisfied with writing big checks to big contractors and calling it development”.

In January, USAid revised its purchasing rules to allow the agency to buy most goods and services from developing countries. But the bulk of US food aid, which falls under the agriculture rather than the aid budget, was not covered by these changes.

The Guardian analysis also reveals how food aid is still used to export US agricultural surpluses. The US government has said that it

is no longer a surplus disposal programme and most of the commodities shipped as food aid are the major grains.

But also on the list is 80 tonnes of canned pink salmon shipped to Cambodia and Laos through a “food for education” programme, which provides food for school meals, and maternal and child nutrition projects. It was added to the list after a glut led industry groups and Alaska state officials to lobby in Washington for salmon to be added to the list of foods that were eligible.

The potato industry also hopes to raise its share of US food aid business. In 1999, the US Potato Board (USPB) launched a special initiative to get dehydrated American potatoes into the government’s overseas food aid programmes. Last year the government bought 550 metric tonnes of dehydrated Idaho potatoes for shipment to Guatemala and Guinea-Bissau.

But getting on the list of eligible commodities is just the first step. The main challenge, says the USPB, is persuading non-governmental organisations to request their products. Earlier this year, the industry body brought 11 organisations to Idaho Falls, Idaho, for a special demonstration of how “dehy” potato can be used in food aid packages.

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This article originally appeared in **The Guardian**, 18 July, 2012 (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2012/jul/18/us-multinationals-control-food-aid>).

# London 2012: The gender-equality Olympics?

By Heather Mc Robie



WOMEN FROM competing teams shake hands after their volleyball match at the fifth day of the recently concluded London Olympics. Photo Credit: Andy Wikes

The 2012 London Olympics have been heralded as the best Olympics yet for women, the first time the games have had female athletes representing all the participating countries. As remarkable female athletes continue to set new world records, these games are a golden period for celebrating the successes of female athletes worldwide, many of whom have had to overcome significant challenges to take their place at the Olympics.

Still, predictably enough, though this is a period of appreciating the successes of sportswomen and pushing for further progress, still we find that sexism is continuing to hang around like an uninvited guest at the Olympics party. And, indeed, there have already been several noteworthy contenders for the Most Misogynistic Medal this year. First up is the debacle of the press coverage of women's beach volleyball, heralded as the Olympics' "sexiest sport" by breathless media outlets, which provided ample opportunity for female athletics to be treated as made-for-men pornography, with the mayor of London likening the "semi-naked" female competitors to "wet otters", and a media treatment leading to the parody: "what if all sports were photographed like women's beach volleyball?"

Yet the exhibiting of female athletes primarily as passive fodder for the 'male gaze' continues through the Olympics like a retro parade (in Britain, after all, these are the times for retro parades, distracting the masses with stock pageantry, and arcane gender roles fit so neatly into the Jubilee-bunting adornments of the 2012 British summer). The sexist commentary runs the gamut from Australian newspapers bullying a female swimmer for 'gaining weight' to sports commentators asking female Olympics gymnastics teams if they had "seen any diva moments yet", the word 'diva' having obvious gendered connotations of hysterical women throwing tantrums, rather than

professional, competitive athletes. Apart from gender stereotyping, another ongoing concern is whether they receive coverage at all: the Fair Game campaign to end sexism in sport notes that currently 5% of sports media coverage in the UK features women.

How sports commentators describe male and female successes is also key: in a report that brought back memories of the event last year in which Sky sports commentators Andy Gray and Richard Keys were caught on air making sexist remarks about lineswoman Sian Massey, a recent study of past Olympics coverage by American network NBC found that sports commentators spoke differently of sportspersons depending on their gender – namely that when female athletes succeed, commentators tend to focus on ‘luck’ more than when male athletes win, yet when female athletes fail it is more about their ability and commitment than when male athletes fail, when the male competitors’ success is more noted.

As always, the most disheartening examples are the undermining of women by other women, that most clever trick of patriarchy that comedian and ‘Mean Girls’ writer Tina Fey once called “girl on girl crime”: a case in point from last week was the overwhelming response on Twitter, mainly by women, to American gymnast Gabby Douglas, who became an Olympic gold medallist this year at 16 years old – the overwhelming response, that is, to how Gabby should wear her hair. The racial politics of hairstyles (that ‘straight’ Caucasian hair is still seen as professional and ‘neat’ whereas African-American hair is seen as ‘wild’ and ‘unkempt’) intersected grimly with women policing other women’s appearance and ‘attractiveness’ – hardly an activity that deserves an award – leading to Serena Williams to come to Douglas’s defence. Bullying a sixteen year old girl who has won an Olympic gold medal seems ridiculous, when you think how cruel and unnecessary it is to bully any sixteen year old girl. Yet female athletes being harassed by online trolling continues to be a serious problem that sportswomen perpetually – and should not have to – deal with: 23 year old Olympic swimming competitor Rebecca Adlington, for instance, recently spoke out about the abuse she received about her appearance on Twitter. Adlington, unlike those who abuse her about her appearance online, now holds the title of Olympic bronze champion.

In fact, one of the clear developments of these ‘most gender equal yet’ Olympics – a sign of progress, even if it is a response to continued misogyny – is that female athletes have increasingly been speaking out about sexism, and putting their detractors firmly in their place. After winning a silver medal, cyclist Lizzie Armitstead used the media platform she was given to speak out about the “overwhelming sexism” that she has experienced throughout her career and still persists in sport, opening a discussion on how the media still “uses sex” to sell female sport to male spectators.

18 year old Olympic weightlifter Zoe Smith also spoke out to slam down the sexist trolls (who presumably aren’t winning gold medals in anything) who responded to a BBC documentary on Zoe and her teammates by commenting online about how they didn’t find her attractive: “This may be shocking to you, but we actually would rather be attractive to people who aren’t closed-minded and ignorant. ... We, as any women with an ounce of self-confidence would, prefer our men to be confident enough in themselves to not feel emasculated by the fact that we aren’t weak and feeble” she wrote.

With female athletes having to spend so much time dealing with this kind of abuse, it’s impressive they still manage to perform at the top of their game. Yet female athletes also face the disadvantage of less sponsorship than their male counterparts: a recent report commissioned by the Women’s Sport and Fitness Foundation found that only 0.5% of all commercial sports sponsorship goes to women’s sports while 61% goes to male sports (and the rest to sports in which both genders compete), an inequity Lizzie Armitstead has described as presenting a significant burden for female athletes.

So, a brief tally so far: unequal sponsorship, unequal media coverage, emphasising female athletes’ appearance over performance, speaking about their successes as ‘luck’, and calling young female Olympians “ugly” and “whales” – yep, there are a lot of Misogyny Medals to go round. And some sterling runners-up too: Japanese and Australian female soccer teams flying

**London 2012...**  
**(continued on p. 30)**

# Impunity Returns to Peru

By Jo-Marie Burt



THE COFFINS of nine villagers are displayed in the main plaza of El Santa, Áncash, Peru. They were disappeared by members of the Grupo Colina death squad in 1992. Their remains were found only last year, after 19 years. Photo Credit: The Advocacy Project

**T**he Peruvian Supreme Court has handed down a highly controversial sentence in a case involving the members of the Colina Group death squad. According to human rights defenders and the victims in the relevant cases, the sentence is a major step backward in Peru's tortured quest for truth and justice in cases of egregious human rights violations.

The sentence refers to three crimes committed by the notorious Colina Group, a military unit responsible for a series of human rights violations between 1991 and 1992: the 1991 massacre of Barrios Altos, in which 15 people, including an eight-year-old child, were murdered and four others gravely wounded as well as the forced disappearance in 1992 of journalist Pedro Yauri and nine peasant leaders from the community of Santa.

The verdict not only reduces the sentences of renowned criminals, including former security chief Vladimiro Montesinos, but also turns on its head established jurisprudence of previous Supreme Court decisions, decisions by Peru's Constitutional Tribunal, and rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

The Minister of Justice Juan Jiménez Mayor, who recently became prime minister, criticized the sentence as "shameful." Eduardo Vega, Peru's ombudsman, stated that the verdict represented a "serious setback" in Peru's efforts to achieve accountability for grave human rights violations and called for its rectification. President Ollanta Humala also noted his surprise at the verdict. Human rights groups have criticized the sentence and have stated that they will pursue actions domestically and internationally to challenge it.

## Barrios Altos

The initial investigation into the Barrios Altos massacre was closed in 1995 after the Fujimori government passed two amnesty laws that granted impunity to state agents accused of human rights violations during the internal armed conflict (1980-1995). The victims and their legal representatives took the case to the Inter-American system. In 2001, the Inter-American Court for Human Rights issued a verdict in the case, determining the responsibility of the Peruvian state for the massacre and ordering the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of those responsible. The same verdict determined that that 1995 amnesty laws violated international law and lacked legal standing.

As a result, the Barrios Altos case was reopened. The case is a complex one, involving 15 victims and 31 defendants. Later the cases of Pedro Yauri and Santa were incorporated into the legal proceedings as part of a “mega-trial” against the Colina Group members. The process was plagued by delays, however. The investigation lasted five years before the public trial started in 2005. Then, due to a number of factors, but especially the delay tactics of the defendants’ lawyers, the public trial lasted another five years. Finally, in October 2010, the court found 19 of the 31 members of the Colina Group responsible for the crimes.

The most severe sentences, the maximum of 25 years, were reserved for the intellectual authors of the crime — Vladimiro Montesinos, the de facto head of the National Intelligence Service (SIN), Gen. Julio Salazar Monroe, actual head of the SIN, and Gen. Nicolás Hermoza Ríos, former army chief, and Gen. Juan Rivero Lazo, former head of Army Intelligence— as well as for the chief operational heads of the Colina Group, former Army Major Santiago Martin Rivas and Carlos Pichilingue. The majority of defendants appealed the ruling.

The Supreme Court announced its sentence in the case on July 20, 2012. The most controversial measures include a reduction in the sentences of virtually all those convicted, including Montesinos and Hermoza Ríos, which Supreme Court justice Javier Villa Stein said was in “compensation” for the lengthy legal process.

But rights advocates say that the most questionable measures are related to a number of legal arguments that

overturn the original sentence’s determination that the Barrios Altos massacre and the forced disappearances of Pedro Yauri and the peasants of Santa constituted crimes against humanity; that these crimes were committed by an organized apparatus of the state that constituted an unlawful association created for the purpose of committing criminal acts; and that Montesinos, Hermoza Ríos, Rivero Lazo and Salazar Monroe were responsible as *autores mediatos* of the crime, the same legal concept used to prosecute Alberto Fujimori for the Barrios Altos massacre, the La Cantuta murders, and two kidnappings. Of special concern, say human rights advocates, the sentence states that the Barrios Altos massacre does not constitute a crime against humanity. Although acknowledging that the crimes committed by the Colina Group were part of official state policy, the court concluded that the policy was not directed against the civilian population but rather against terrorists.

## Reactions

Human rights groups have challenged each of these arguments point by point. The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission has documented the systematic nature of the Colina Group’s crimes, which has been recognized in the verdicts issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Barrios Altos case as well as in the case of La Cantuta. The sentence handed down by the Special Criminal Court for the Fujimori case, which was ratified in December 2009 by the Supreme Court, recognized Barrios Altos and La Cantuta as crimes against humanity not only because they were directed at civilians but because they were a planned operation that was part of an official state policy of systematic violations of human rights. Additionally, the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal recognized in 2005 that the crimes committed by the Colina Group—including the Barrios Altos massacre— constituted “crimes against humanity.”

The Supreme Court sentence has been sharply and widely criticized. The Vice Minister of Justice and Human Rights Daniel Figallo presented a writ of *amparo* before the Constitutional Tribunal, the only legal remedy available within Peru to challenge a verdict of the Supreme Court and protect individuals from state abuses. Several parliamentarians have said that they would present a constitutional challenge against the Supreme Court judges who issued the verdict.

Diverse civil society groups, from labour organizations to human rights groups, said that they would petition the Inter-American Court to nullify the sentence.

Gloria Cano, head lawyer for APRODEH, one of the organizations representing the victims in the criminal proceedings, sharply questioned the ruling for its clear intent to favour not only those convicted in this legal process but ultimately former president Alberto Fujimori, who was sentenced in 2009 to 25 years in prison in the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta cases. “The Villa Stein court has provided a magnificent political tool [to Alberto Fujimori] to challenge his guilty verdict,” concludes Carlos Rivera, head lawyer for the Instituto de Defensa Legal, another NGO representing the victims in this case.

International law prevents pardons for crimes against humanity. By removing the status of “crime against humanity” in the Barrios Altos massacre, the Villa Stein sentence could provide new arguments for Fujimori’s supporters to propose if not a challenge to his guilty verdict, then at least a pardon for Fujimori. However, according to Peruvian law, those sentenced for the crime of aggravated kidnapping, as is the case for former President Fujimori, cannot receive a pardon.

Also of concern has been the attitude of Supreme Court Justice Javier Villa Stein, widely seen as the architect of the sentence. In the wake of the criticisms of the Barrios Altos-Yauri-Santa sentence, Villa Stein assumed a combative tone, accusing Minister of Justice Jiménez Mayor of “stoking the fire” and being a “polarizing figure” for his comments criticizing the verdict. He stated that he would welcome a challenge to his sentence before the Inter-American Court, which rights advocates have said they will pursue. Most shockingly, Villa Stein mocked human rights groups, saying they should not continue to “whine” (“lloriquear”) about the sentence.

Previously, APRODEH sought to have Villa Stein disqualified from this and other legal processes involving human rights cases due to his political positions. According to APRODEH, with regard to the Chavín

de Huántar case, another highly controversial legal process involving the accusation that Montesinos and others carried out at least one extrajudicial execution in the aftermath of the hostage rescue operation at the Japanese ambassador’s residence in 1997, Villa Stein asserted that NGOs defending victims in human rights cases were motivated by a desire to undermine the prestige of the Peruvian armed forces.

The Constitutional Tribunal rejected APRODEH’s petition, saying that Villa Stein had a right to voice his personal political views and that these would not prejudice the legal proceedings. However, in the wake of the sentence and Villa Stein’s dismissive comments, broad sectors of civil society are calling for his removal as a Supreme Court justice.

The victims of political violence in Peru have fought long and hard to overcome diverse forms of institutionalized impunity, including two amnesty laws, that prevented them from knowing the fate of their missing loved ones and seeing those responsible for these crimes prosecuted and punished. After the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission released its 2003 report, recommending the criminal prosecution of several cases of grave human rights violations, special bodies were set up in the public ministry and the judiciary to investigate and prosecute these crimes and facilitate the rights of the victims to truth and justice. A number of important sentences, including the Fujimori verdict, were passed down beginning in 2005.

In recent years, however, numerous obstacles have emerged that have undermined these special human rights courts and the broader process of justice for victims of state-sponsored human rights violations in Peru. The Villa Stein sentence is one more factor contributing to new forms of impunity in Peru today. ■

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This article was first published by the online news and analysis website, [openDemocracy.net](http://www.opendemocracy.net) 31 July 2012 (<http://www.opendemocracy.net/jo-marie-burt/impunity-returns-to-peru>). **Jo Marie Burt** is Director of Latin American Studies at George Mason University and Senior Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). She was a researcher for the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

# FILM REVIEW: ½ Revolution

By Laura Aumeer

*Karim El-Hakim and Omar Shargawi's new documentary tells the story of Tahrir Square.*



In a downtown Cairo apartment, on a small grainy television screen, there is a screenshot of the crowds in Tahrir Square. Next to it, a shot of a rather smaller group of people chanting for Hosni Mubarak, which the state-run media would have the people believe, is simply a close-up of the larger crowd. Yet a brief walk away, reality beckons – Tahrir is filled with crowds demanding an end to Mubarak’s regime. There is also the army, the police, tear gas, US-made bullets and blood.

A snapshot of Egypt in 2011, this is but one scene from the documentary *½ Revolution* which charts the experiences and concerns of its half-Egyptian directors Karim El-Hakim and Omar Shargawi, their families and friends during the tumultuous period. The documentary features scenes in homes and the streets filmed on hand-held cameras up to seven days before Mubarak resigned. The film thus shows half the revolution. But as El Hakim and Shargawi make clear, this symbolically also reflects the fact that the revolution today remains an unfinished story.

## **Military positions**

What the documentary best provides is an honest look at life at the time of the revolution, free from special effects. At the same time, however, many of the concerns it raises are still pertinent today. 18 months after Mubarak stepped down, for example, the military

remains dominant. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) granted itself sweeping powers last month, granting itself legislative powers and a greater role in the constitution-building process.

Speaking at the Barbican Centre for the London premiere of *½ Revolution*, El-Hakim condemned the stance of the military. He reasoned that it was wrong to have people who have been “taught how to kill, running civil society”, especially when there are no adequate ways for the public to hold them accountable. Some claim that one authoritarian regime has simply replaced another. However, the military has long had a significant degree of autonomy and authority in Egypt. The Egyptian army is said to control anywhere between 15-40 % of the economy and, historically, has always had strong influence on civil society. In light of their historical role in the country, their stranglehold now should not be surprising.

The military is ever present in *½ Revolution*. As the first tanks enter the square, some Cairenes hope the military will not hurt their own “mothers and sisters”. It is not long, however, before El-Hakim sees tanks drive over about five people.

## **The emotions of the revolution**

While there are symbolic parallels to be drawn with contemporary events in Egypt, the main power of ½

*Revolution* lies in its ability to convey the emotional experience of the 2011 uprising. The directors clearly have strong opinions on the progress of democracy and upheaval in Egypt today, but the film primarily aims, in El-Hakim's words, to "make the revolution, which is this huge monster, more accessible".

In the documentary then, we hear voices decrying unemployment and poverty, and expressing the grievances which lay behind calls for Mubarak to step down. Viewers are immersed in the revolutionary experience: the fearful telephone conversations, the confusion, the blood-covered ground with the word Masr (Egypt) scrawled in it and the tissues soaked in vinegar to ward off tear gas.

The film also forces the audience to question assumptions and preconceptions about the process of change in Egypt. The revolution is often portrayed in a rather triumphant manner – according to straightforward accounts, the people protested, spurred on by social media, and in 18 days forced the president to resign. The documentary restores an understanding of the complex truth and less than glamorous events that took place during the revolution – in those 18 days, people were also buying up supplies, leaving the country and locking themselves in their flats, cautiously peering out to see the violence below.

The role of social media during January and February of 2011 has also often been exaggerated. *½ Revolution* does reveal a tech-savvy population, fully aware of what was going on across Cairo through Facebook or Twitter. El-Hakim's flat only had access to the state-run television channels promulgating propaganda about the demonstrations. Even though the government shut down the internet briefly, surveys from 2010 suggest that only 27% of the population were classed as internet users. *½ Revolution* shows that it was instead word of mouth that proved to be the most effective revolutionary tool.

Egypt's transition has been far more extensively and internationally covered than any revolutions of the past – that does not necessarily mean, however, that the story of the uprising has been told more fully than any previously. Shargawi and El-Hakim's film is important in that it shows an event without romanticising it or retrospectively attaching a grand narrative to it. ■

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This article was initially published in the online news portal, Think Africa Press, 16 July, 2012 (<http://thinkafricapress.com/egypt/review-half-revolution-film-tahrir-square-jan25>). Laura Aumeer is a Mauritian-British freelance writer. She has a particular interest in North Africa.

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## London 2012... (continued from p. 25)

economy while their male counterparts fly first-class, the 'Thanks Mom' Olympics advert by Proctor and Gamble reinforcing regressive gender roles of women primarily of value as home-makers, hints of sexism (and racism) in the Ye Shiwen doping allegations, ESPN's 'Body Issue' featuring US Olympians with the male athletes in active and 'action' poses and female athletes primarily in passive, 'male gaze' poses.

But at least there has been one new achievement: the amount of discussion about the need to increase support for female athletes, in terms of both coverage and sponsorship, and the significance of so many female athletes at the top of their game speaking out about – and saying they're fed up with – the sexism they experience. Seeing women's football on television as part of the Olympics may, for instance, finally increase its status after the Olympics end, while the successes of athletes such as Adlington and Armitstead will hopefully encourage more young women to participate in these sports. As female Olympians continue to win medals and break records, now is the time to also beat the broken-record of sexism in sport. ■

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This article was first published by the online news website [openDemocracy.net](http://www.opendemocracy.net). 6 August 2012 (<http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/heather-microbie/gender-equality-olympics-medals-and-penalties-so-far>). Heather McRobie is a PhD candidate at Oxford University, where she studies transitional justice in the Arab Spring.

**How to measure... (continued from p. 14)**


Programme (UNDP) recently pledged to double its overall support for disaster reduction over the next five years, while a recent Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) meeting was devoted to “adapting humanitarian efforts to an urban world”.

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), composed of humanitarian assistance groups, set up a task force in 2009 to meet humanitarian challenges in urban areas, which has compiled dozens of tools to identify city-dwellers in need of urgent assistance.


The very people most in need of help often seek urban refuges for their anonymity, obscuring efforts to count, identify and help them, said François Grünewald, executive director of the research, training and evaluation group, Urgence, Réhabilitation et Développement, located in France.

“People come to cities to disappear, so you cannot cut and paste tools used in other places [to target them]. There needs to be a different way of doing things in cities.”■

This article was originally published by **IRIN News**, 27 August 2012 (<http://www.irinnews.org/Report/96176/How-to-Measure-urban-poverty>). IRIN is a humanitarian news and analysis service of the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.



July to August 2012




May - June 2012  
Debunking the hype about the “Asian Century”



March - April 2012  
Rights for Sustainability



Jan - Feb 2012  
TPPA: NAFTA clone for Asia-Pacific?



Nov - Dec 2011  
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